Abstract-We study the problem of secret-key generation in a wireless environment by exploiting the inherent randomness and reciprocity of the channel gain. A channel model is proposed which takes into account the effect of reflections (or re-radiations) from receive antenna elements, thus capturing a physical property of practical antennas. It turns out that the reflections have a deteriorating effect on the achievable secretkey rate at high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). These insights provide guidelines in the design and operation of communication systems using the properties of the wireless channel to prevent eavesdropping.
I. Introduction
Secret-key generation based on the randomness of the wireless channel has garnered much attention recently, since it provides an alternative to existing higher layer approaches. The essential idea stems from certain properties of channel statistics, especially from the fact that spatial correlation of the channel decreases rapidly with distance [1] . Maurer [2] and Ahlswede et al. [3] have provided results on secret-key rates by exploiting dependent (or common) sources of randomness. The largest achievable key rate (in bits per source symbol) without leaking any information to a possible eavesdropper is termed the secret-key capacity. The wireless channel is characterized by its inherent randomness and broadcast nature, thus, itself providing a possible source for generating secret keys. In this context, different approaches have been proposed utilizing the characteristics of the wireless channel to generate secret keys. The interested reader may refer to [4] - [8] . Recently, physical experiments have been conducted providing an estimate of the achievable secret key rate in indoor environments [9] . In that work, it was shown that the characteristics of the channel essential for generating secure keys, such as the spatial decorrelation at the eavesdropper, depend on the environment significantly. It was also shown recently that the coherence time of the channel plays a significant role in obtaining secret keys [10] , and that additional measures have to be taken into account to ensure secure communication. Based on those results, one might argue that channel models traditionally used for communications without secrecy constraints might result in too optimistic outcomes when used for secure communication analysis. If too simplistic models are utilized to estimate the achievable secret-key rates, they do not fully consider the underlying physical phenomena relevant for secret key generation.
From prior work, it is clear that several pitfalls occur in practical realizations. In [11] , Chou et al. investigated a setting in which the wireless channel exhibits a sparsity pattern, that can be utilized by the eavesdropper to learn more about the main channel. In an another related work [12] it was shown that antennas scatter a significant amount of power. Due to the broadcast nature of the medium, this power might be intercepted by an eavesdropper, and can use the reflected signal to learn about the current channel state between the legitimate users. Furthermore, they also presented a method to show that how the eavesdropper can reconstruct the impact of simple environments on the current channel state.
In this work, we propose a channel model which captures the phenomenon of reflection occurring at any real world antenna. The legitimate users exchange pilot signals in two phases in order to estimate the current channel state. However, due to the reflection at the antennas, a proportion of the signal is intercepted by the eavesdropper. It turns out that, by taking the reflection into account, the achievable secret-key rate is decreasing as the signal-to-noise ratio at the eavesdropper is at moderate to high levels. Therefore, there is a distinct signal-to-noise ratio where the achievable secret-key rate is maximized.
The paper is structured as follows: In section II, the system model is introduced. Section III outlines the physical effects from antenna theory that establish the power reflection. In section IV, the general bounds on secret-key rates are formulated, while in sections V and VI the bounds are computed and evaluated for some special cases. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. System model
When the training signals are exchanged at the legitimate users, four signals can be defined as follows: The overall communication setup is shown in Fig. 1 
In this work, it is assumed that the eavesdropper has the capability of decoupling all four received signals Eqs. (3) to (6) without interference, e.g., by using multi-antenna techniques. Some amount of power is reflected at Alice's antenna and re-radiated as new transmitted signal, which can be observed by Eve in y E3 . The parameter α with |α| < 1 describes the proportion of Alice's received signal that is reflected. This parameter comprises all contributions to the reflection like the re-radiation, the impedance mismatch and the structural scattering, which will be described in more details in section III. Accordingly, Eve's observation y E4 stems from the reflection at Bob's antenna. Also, the noise terms
III. Sources of reflection In this section, the phenomenon of reflections at antennas is discussed based on known results from antenna theory. From past work [13] - [15] , three possible sources of reflections can be identified.
1) Some power reflection might result from impedance mismatches in the receiver network. Relevant mismatches can occur in any elements close to the antenna (see Fig. 2 ). Usually the antenna impedance Z A is conjugately matched to the load impedance Z L in order to achieve maximum power throughput. into the circuit but re-radiated in a scattering field instead.
3) The antenna structure itself introduces a scattering field. This field depends on the structure, shape and material of the antenna and has a different directivity pattern than the re-radiated scattering field. Scattered and re-radiated portions of power from the receiving antenna are related to a scattering field. In literature, the total scattering field is often described as the superposition of two components
The component E r is the scattering field re-radiated by the antenna for unit input current. On the other hand, E S (Z L = ∞) denotes the scattering field in case of an open-loop circuit at the antenna feed point. Furthermore, V OC the induced voltage at the antenna feed point, Z A the antenna impedance and Z L the complex load impedance. The antenna impedance is obtained by
where R l is the loss resistance, R r the radiation resistance and X A the antenna reactance. A popular model to describe the behaviour of an antenna in reception mode is the Thévenin model, which is depicted in Fig. 3 . It is a good approximation at least for dipole antennas which operate close to the resonance frequency. The model assumes the same antennas at transmitter and receiver (full reciprocity) which are located in far field with respect to each other. In addition the antennas should be small, the dielectric without loss and the ground ideal. As depicted
Receiver system with antenna impedance Z A , transmission line impedance Z CH , receiver impedance Z R and overall load impedance Z L at the feed point [14] . Fig. 3 : Thévenin equivalent circuit for a receiving antenna.
in Fig. 3 , the model basically characterizes a series RLC circuit. A current flowing through the radiation resistance R r contributes to the scattering field of the antenna, which is basically captured by E r in (7). In order to evaluate the impact of re-radiation in more detail, some power calculations are made on the basis of Thévenin equivalent circuit. To make following calculations simpler, a perfectly conjugate matched load is assumed:
Now the complex power that is fed into the load at the receiver side can be calculated:
So the power output into the load is
while the power dissipated as heat is
and finally the re-radiated power is
Using Eqs. (11) to (13), the total power at the receiver side is
From these considerations, one can define the re-radiation ratio
This straightforward result means that for a completely lossless antenna always half the total power is re-radiated. However, this result does not fully capture the total scattering power since the component E S (Z L = ∞) from (7) is not considered, which is the residual electric field if the feed circuit is open and no current flows. While capturing the impact of (15) in secret-key generation is a future research topic of itself, here we employ the basic model given in (5) and (6) with a coefficient α to evaluate the essential impact the reflections might have on secret-key rates. This is further justified by the investigations of [12] , in which it was shown by practical measurements that a significant amount of power is scattered from the receiver side for an antenna in open-loop mode.
IV. Secret-key rates The overall setup refers to the source-type model with wiretapper [3] , where the legitimate users agree on a secret key. The observations at Alice, Bob and Eve are interpreted as the outputs of memoryless, but correlated sources. The upper bound on the secret key rate is given by [3] This assumption is justified if Eve is located further away from Alice and Bob such that the channel coefficients undergo a rapid spatial decorrelation. As a consequence, the observations y E1 from (3) and y E2 from (4) can be neglected for all rate calculations since they are independent of all other observations. However, it needs to be verified if that assumption holds in specific practical environments. Especially the required minimum distance is an important parameter to consider. Since we mainly focus on the qualitative impact of reflections at the antennas, this aspect is not further investigated here. The channel coefficients h AB and h BA are correlated with ρ AB , while h AE and h BE are correlated with ρ E . Furthermore, the variances of the legitimate users' channels are set to σ 2 = σ 
The SNR at Alice' and Bob's receiver is
while Eve's SNR is equal to
E SNR, since only the reflected observations are considered.
Finally, for comparison, we derive secret-key rates if the reflection is not taken into account. In this case, the eavesdropper does not have any observation at all and the secret-key capacity is
V. Key rates without CSIE In this section, we assume that Eve has no CSIE (channel state information at the eavesdropper), i.e. the channel coefficients h AE and h BE are unknown to her. The upper bound on the secret-key rate is given by
where (a) follows by the definition of mutual information and (b) follows by the chain rule of entropies. The lower bound is accordingly
where (a) applies the chain rule of entropies again and (b) exploits the fact that y A and y B are identically distributed. Therefore the entropies of y A and y B are the same and the minimum of equal values is taken. Since the multivariate distributions from (20) and (21) are non-Gaussian due to the reflection terms y E3 and y E4 , we use entropy estimators to calculate the joint entropies.
The entropy estimation utilizes a combination of the knearest neighbor estimator (NNE) from [16] and a kernel density estimator (KDE) from [17] . The results of the simulation for the special case σ 2 E = 1 are illustrated in Fig. 4 . This case covers the situation when the power of the training symbols is increased by the legitimate users in order to have improved SNR, but Eve benefits from that as well. The simulation reveals that, for relatively small SNR, the achievable secret-key rate is almost unaffected by Eve's presence. However, from a certain point on, the key rates drop and the lower and upper bound diverge and decrease. Furthermore it turns out that the parameter α determines the width of the peak in the lower bound. The parameter basically has a "retarding" effect on the point when the rate drops, so for a small α the peak broadens. In addition, the parameter ρ AB defines the saturation level in the high SNR regime. The optimal SNR at maximum rate can be obtained numerically.Surprisingly even with negligible noise at the eavesdropper, a positive secret-key rate is still possible. This might be due to the fact that Eve always encounters her unknown channel coefficients, which impede her in the estimation of h AB or h BA .
If we consider the more general case, i.e. if σ 2 E can be chosen arbitrarily, the lower bound is depicted in Fig. 5 . For low SNR at Alice's receiver, no secret-key agreement is possible. However, for higher SNR, there is always a positive secret-key rate regardless of how accurate Eve's observation might be. The lower bound of Fig. 4 is retrieved as a special case, if one cuts through the plane of Fig. 5 in a line parallel to the main diagonal with SNR Eve (dB) = SNR Alice (dB) + 20 log 10 (α). VI. Key rates with CSIE Another scenario comes into play if Eve knows her channel coefficients perfectly, thus she has full CSIE. The bounds of (16) and (17) are then conditioned on h AE and h BE , respectively. As a consequence, the model from (18) simply reduces to the multivariate Gaussian case. Therefore, one needs to average over all possible realizations of the channel coefficients in order to calculate average rates. The upper bound is obtained by
and the lower bound by
where (a) takes the minimum of equal terms of mutual information since they both depend on random variables with the same distribution. The chain rule of mutual information is utilized in (b), and (c) exploits the fact that h AE and h BE are independent of Alice's observation. The result is illustrated in Fig. 6 and in addition in Fig. 7 for the case of full reciprocity. Compared to the case without CSIE, both bounds are dropping to zero when Eve's SNR increases. Thus full CSIE means the worstcase scenario in terms of secret-key rate. More specifically, the terminals obtain the observations of (18), but now the channel coefficients h AE and h BE are fully known by the eavesdropper. The resulting achievable secret-key rates are illustrated in Fig. 8 . Now the saturation level has vanished for higher values of SNR Eve . Naturally Eve obtains a profound knowledge of the channel coefficient for high SNR, therefore no positive secret-key rate is possible.
VII. conclusion
In this paper, the impact of reflections, a phenomenon present at any practical antenna, on the secret-key rate based on the randomness of the wireless channel is investigated. At first, the rather optimistic case without channel state information at the eavesdropper (CSIE) is considered. At low SNR, the secret-key rates are almost unaffected by eavesdropping. From a certain point on, the key rates drop due to Eve's observations, depending on the antenna reflection. At high SNR the key rate might still be positive since Eve is impeded by the unknown channel realizations. The saturation level at high SNR is mostly determined by the correlation of Alice's and Bob's observations. Considering the more realistic case of full CSIE, however, the achievable secret-key rate drops significantly without a saturation level at high SNR since Eve learns the information on the key error-free due to the reflections from the antennas of the legitimate nodes. As a consequence, by operating at an appropriate SNR, the secret-key rate is maximal. In contrast to that, if this operation point is left, the secret-key rate is less due to the effect of additive noise in the communication chain or the reflections at the antennas. For future work, the impact of antenna reflections on the secret-key generation should be validated in a practical setup. In addition, a MIMO scenario can be studied as an extension.
